In this comparison it appears that, though the mileage of freight trains of more than 50 cars was 61 per cent of the entire mileage of freight trains, the number of fatalities to employees in connection with these trains was only 6.2 per cent of the total number, and fatalities to passengers only 13.3 per cent of the total. Put in more definite terms, the data show that, for an equal number of miles run by long and short trains, the number of employees killed in connection with long freight trains was less than 5 per cent of the number killed in connection with short trains, while the number injured was only 28 per cent.

During a hearing before a committee of the Virginia Assembly, George P. Johnson, then general manager of the Chesapeake & Ohio, presented a statement relating to that road and covering a service of 4,896,326 train-miles for the year ending June 30, 1913, showing the relative numbers of casualties resulting from the operation of trains of more than 50 cars and of trains of 50 cars or less, as follows:

This statement shows that 12,073 trains, or 48 per cent of the whole number operated, consisted of more than 50 cars, and 13,099, or 52 per cent, consisted of 50 cars or less, including passenger trains. While the number of long and short trains was thus nearly equal, the number of fatalities in connection with the long trains was only one-eighth of the number in connection with short trains, and the number of injuries less than one-ninth as great.

A summary has been made by the railways operating in Illinois showing for the year 1913 the number of employees killed or seriously injured on all trains run in that state by 23 roads. These are subdivided to show the relation of numbers of casualties occurring in connection with the operation of trains of over 50 cars and trains of 50 cars or less. The data in detail are shown in the accompanying table:

Here again, though the number of trains of more than 50 cars was 57 per cent as great as the number of trains of 50 cars or less, the number of fatalities in connection with the long trains was only 53 per cent as great as in connection with the short trains, and the number of injuries less than one-third as great. Or, put differently, for the same number of trains of each class, the number killed in connection with long trains was only about nine-tenths of the number killed in connection with short trains, while the number injured was only about one-half.

It may be argued that statistics of this character are not conclusive because of the difference in the character of the services performed by the two classes of trains. Reference is made to the fact that short trains include all local and way service trains in connection with which the service performed by trainmen includes sources of risk not found in the same degree in the through service performed by long trains. But if, as this argument concludes, long trains are used in a class of service in which, owing to its character, the risk of accident is relatively less, it follows that this particular argument gives relatively little or no ground for legislation to reduce the length of the trains used in this service.

Furthermore, the fact that there are elements in the character of the service ordinarily performed by short trains that render their

operation more liable to produce casualties, it is explained by the opponents of train-limit legislation, would argue for a possible increase in casualties if short trains were substituted for long ones. The long train ordinarily moves at a regular rate of speed, which is slower than the speeds often attained by short trains. It ordinarily makes fewer stops, and therefore incurs less risk of accidents in starting and stopping. If train length were restricted as proposed, the shortening of trains would necessarily increase those risks of accident which arise from the operation of relatively short trains at higher rates of speed.

Analysis of the Causes of Accidents, with Respect to the Effect of Long Trains.

That long trains do not tend to increase the risk of accidents in any material degree, if at all, is indicated, not only by the general considerations previously stated, but also by an analysis of the causes of accidents to trainmen, as assigned in the statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The causes of accidents to trainmen, as reported by the Commission, fall into fifteen principal classes. Casualties classified according to cause, with sub-classes in the case of such main classes as could, by any possibility, be affected by the length of trains, are presented in Table V following, which applies to the fiscal year ended June 30, 1915. In the table, those immediate causes are italicized which may be reasonably considered as having been themselves due to length of train in more than rare instances. Casualties to trainmen, only, are given because they are more likely to be influenced by the length of trains than are accidents to any other class of persons. In the case of collisions and derailments, the Commission does not classify the casualties in detail according to causes.

'Some rear-end collisions may conceivably have occurred to long trains after being forced to stop by reason of breakage due to their great length. Some rear and butting collisions may conceivably have happened because of greater delay in stopping or starting trains of great length. But it is not believed, as a practical matter, that such accidents could have been numerous enough to deserve recognition in this table.

*Page numbers refer to I. C. C. Accident Bulletin, No. 56 (1915).