I did not understand that the Georgia case was an antitrust case entirely. But I do believe that, whether it is or is not, to put into a law before that case is tried words which nulifies the law, and completely wipes out all that the proposed law seeks to do, in S. 110, or H. R. 221 is improper. Mr. O'HARA. That happens to have occurred before this law, or this bill could become a law. That suit would not involve anything whatever after this legislation passes, would it? Mr. BRYAN. No; it would not. I do believe though that the bill as originally intended, a way back prior to even the Georgia case, in 1943, and prior to that even when attempts were made to put into effect a law of this kind, that was for the purpose of protecting the shipping public, the public generally and permitting them to agree with their carriers on what their rates may or may not be, without injury or harm or any unlawful action Mr. O'HARA (interposing). I notice that no mention is made in the bill as passed by the other body about the cases out in Nebraska where a prosecution is pending against certain railroads for the violation of the Antitrust Act. I suppose you would be against having any amendment affect that lawsuit in this bill? Mr. BRYAN. I really would. I do not think that the bill should nullify the action of the court in any way nor should the court stop Congress from passing needed laws. Mr. O'HARA. Of course those suits were brought under laws. existing at that time. If this act is passed it, of course, changes the situation, takes them out from under the effect of this bill. The effect would be to take the railroads out from under the effect of the antitrust law and you are in favor of that, are you? Mr. BRYAN. Yes; I am in the sense that I do not believe that the railroads have committed any criminal act under the law as it is today. I have been working with the railroads for nearly 40 years. Mr. O'HARA. You think that they are incapable of committing any criminal act? Mr. BRYAN. Not incapable. I would not say that. I do not believe there has been any criminal act committed with the respect to the regulation of rates by any railroad. Mr. O'HARA. I do not mean criminal; I mean in violation of the antitrust laws. Mr. BRYAN. I did not mean to phrase it that way. I did not mean criminal act. I was speaking in the rough, probably. Mr. O'HARA. All right. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Chairman. Mr. HALL. Mr. Bulwinkle. Mr. BULWINKLE. Mr. Bryan, you stated that you are the chairman of the Legislative Committee of the National Industrial Traffic League? Mr. BRYAN. Chairman of that committee; yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. This League is composed of shippers? Mr. BRYAN. Yes, sir; entirely so. Mr. BULWINKLE. How many shippers have you who are members of the organization? Mr. BRYAN. I believe at present there are close to 1,500 members, but they in turn represent probably three or four hundred thousand shippers large and small in different places. Maybe Mr. Lacey could answer that question. STATEMENT OF E. F. LACEY, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL TRAFFIC LEAGUE Mr. LACEY. There are 1,500 members, but they in turn represent about three or four hundred thousand shippers, large and small in different places. Mr. HALL. Does your name appear in the record? Mr. LACEY. E. F. Lacey, executive secretary, National Industrial Traffic League. Mr. BULWINKLE. Now, Mr. Bryan, you spoke of the Senate bill, section 4, with the words "freight classifications" and said that you thought that that should be eliminated? Mr. LACEY. Yes, sir. Mr. BULWINKLE. Will you tell the committee why those words should not be in and what effect they would have upon the shippers. Mr. BRYAN. The words as they are used in S. 110 seem to us to separate the matter of freight classifications from the consideration of joint rates and joint through routes. We believe as to the latter that it is entirely proper for the representatives of the different classes of transportation agencies to agree upon what the joint rate or joint route might be; but that does not necessarily mean that they should agree upon the classifications of freight. The freight classifications is quite a large volume. It takes in practically-in fact, it takes in every known commodity shipped or received by freight by railroads. The motor carriers classification is very much the same, although it may not be quite so all-inclusive. Those two classifications state the rating that shall apply for the transportation of commodities between points on their respective routes and by their respective modes of transportation. They are competitive one with the other. The rail classification may state that a certain commodity shall take third class, which would mean a certain percentage of first class, while the motor carrier classification might say that that same commodity should take only fourth class; something less than the railroads' classification. As we understand the language as it is used in here where it separates the words "freight classifications" from the words "joint rates or through routes" by using the two little words "or to," it could be interpreted and probably would be interpreted to mean that the carriers, or agents of different types of carriers would be permitted to reach agreements as to the freight classifications themselves. Thus, the motor carriers might say, "We will increase our fourth class rating to your third class rating," and that would not be in the public interest It is a possibility, if not a probability. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, suppose that you would give the committee an illustration, we will say, of furniture? Mr. BRYAN. Of what? Mr. BULWINKLE. Of furniture. Take the rate on furniture and show that. I want you to give an illustration so that it can go into the record. Or, you may use any other article. Mr. BRYAN. I doubt if I can give an illustration on furniture. I have been working with paper rates and rules and regulations all of my life. Mr. BULWINKLE. Well, give us one on anything. Give us an illustration for the benefit of the committee. Mr. BRYAN. I will have to give you approximate rates, because I do not carry them in my mind. Mr. BULWINKLE. Just assume them. Mr. BRYAN. A shipment of paper we will say from a mill point in Wisconsin to Chicago would be carried in the motor carriers classification at a rating of fourth class, which would permit assessment for less-than-carload shipments, or for less-than-truck load shipments, permit an assessment of a rate of about 60 per hundred pounds. The rail classification would provide for the third class rating and the rate would be 72 cents per hundred pounds. Now, with the different types of carriers in agreement, they might state that the rates, that the classifications, shall be third class instead of fourth class and that might mean-it would not necessarily meanthat both rates would be 72 cents. I say it might, because there is a difference in the measure of the motor carrier rates versus the rail rate; but nevertheless if they both agreed upon the third class rate, the rate via the motor carrier would be increased. Mr. BULWINKLE. That is all, thank you. Mr. HALL. Any further questions? Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman. Mr. HALL. Mr. Rogers. Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Bryan, you say you object to the Russell amendment? Mr. BRYAN. Yes. Mr. ROGERS. Would you object to a provision in the bill, a provision in this bill stating that this act in no way affects the present pending litigation? Mr. BRYAN. No; I do not think I would. Mr. ROGERS. You would not object to that? Mr. BRYAN. No; I do not think I would. I do not think the Congress ought to do anything to prevent the present litigation from being concluded and decided by the courts. Mr. ROGERS. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman. Mr. HALL. Mr. Carson. Mr. CARSON. Mr. Bryan, from reading this entire bill I cannot see where there is any use particularly for this Russell amendment. Mr. BRYAN. I cannot see it either. Mr. CARSON. Is there any purpose for this Russell amendment whatsoever? It seems to me that it only adds additional confusion to what confusion already exists. As I get it, the Georgia case-was not that a case charging conspiracy more or less among several defendants and claiming that they used coercion in the fixing of rates and a sort of a discrimination against Georgia in the rates which were fixed? Well, this bill clearly takes out any charge of that kind, as you will see if you read the bill, section 2, particularly, starting in line 15 that brings out that the Commission if it finds after public notice in the Federal Register and public hearing, not less than 60 days thereafter that the object of the agreement is appropriate for the proper performance by the carriers of service to the public, that the agreement is not unjustly discriminatory as between shippers or geographical regions or areas, that it will not unduly restrain competition, and that it is consistent with the public interest as declared by Congress in the National Transportation Policy as set forth in this act so it seems to me the Commission itself could not approve an agreement which in its view would discriminate even against Georgia, with this bill as it is written now, and if you go further into the bill, there are further safeguards. I will refer you to section 6, line 18, where it says in substance that no approval by the Commission shall be so construed as in any manner to remove from the purview of the antitrust laws any restraint upon the right of independent action by any carrier by means of boycott, duress, or intimidation. So as I view it, if in the Georgia case they are able to prove conspiracy, which they allege, they should have no apprehension at all about this S. 110, which has been passed. My opinion is and I want to get your opinion about the Russell amendment, it seems to me only adds much more confusion, and I am fearful that part of it may be detrimental to the constitutionality of this bili. I do not see how that could be done. Mr. BRYAN. As I stated in my typewritten statement Mr. CARSON. I am sorry, I was late and did not get to hear your statement. That is the reason I bring it up.' Mr. BRYAN. I am not thoroughly familiar with the Georgia case, neither am I a lawyer. I am looking at the Russell amendment from the standpoint of a layman and applying my own thoughts to the effect that it may have upon the efficiency of this bill if it is passed, with that amendment appended to it. I believe it would nullify the very thing which this bill is trying to do. Mr. CARSON. That is exactly my view. Mr. BRYAN. That is, preserve for the shipping public the right to meet with the carrier representatives and agencies and committees, which committees would be authorized under this bill to meet in accordance with the agreements and which have been approved by the Commission. And, having been denied that right, the shipping public would then be thrown before the Interstate Commerce Commission in almost innumerable cases and chaotic condition in rate making and rate charges and costs would extend through the country. We have had those a way back when. I have been in this work now for 40 years, about, and I know something about what transpired prior to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and I know what conditions were before we had these committees, these railroad committees to work with, to iron out our own difficulties, and I feel certain that if the Russell amendment is adopted and put into the law that the provisions intended to apply to the protection of the shipping public will be completely nulified, and we hope that the Russell amendment will be stricken. Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. DOLLIVER. Mr. Bryan, I asked this same question of Mr. Fort. Is it not a fact that this bill which we are considering today will in effect make lawful the practices that have already been carried on in these rate conferences? Mr. BRYAN. That is true. I intended to say something on that point and I have said it in my typed statement. We have been working on this, in this manner for upwards of 25 years. Mr. DOLLIVER. You mean by that that the railroads and the Interstate Commerce Commission and the shippers and all interested. parties have been engaging in these rate conferences? Mr. BRYAN. That is what I mean. Mr. DOLLIVER. For 25 years? Mr. BRYAN. Over 25 years. Mr. DOLLIVER. And the results have been satisfactory, I take it, from the standpoint of the people you represent. Mr. BRYAN. That is exactly true, and I would add this, in all my memory there has never been a public complaint made or a complaint made by the shipping public or by the consuming public against the methods that have been employed. Mr. DOLLIVER. The reason you want this legislation is so that these practices which you have found successful, satisfactory, and beneficial, will not come under the attack of some of the prosecuting officials of the Government? Mr. BRYAN. That is right. Mr. DOLLIVER. I think that is all. Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman. Mr. HALL. Mr. O'Hara. Mr. O'HARA. Now, Mr. Bryan, of course, you speak of these conferences. Are they rate bureaus or are they conferences with your league, or with conferences of the railroads themselves, or just what do you have in mind? Mr. BRYAN. The railroads in each rate territory-and the entire United States is divided up into a number of rate territories-have organized committees of expert men who know rates, rules, and regulations. If as a shipper, I asked a railroad serving our mills to consider a certain rate adjustment or an adjustment of a rule, regulation, minimum weight, classification, or certain routing or anything else that might affect the cost of handling our business either to or from our mills, that railroad then places my request before the chairman of the committee in whose jurisdiction his road operates. It is then placed on the public docket. It is printed in The Traffic Bulletin. which is issued weekly. It is published in other issues and it is placed before the public by the committee itself. Anybody at all can have access to those records and they will know exactly what I have been trying to do or anything that any other shipper has been trying to do and may appear before the railroads themselves either individually or collectively or before the committee appointed by the parent committee, as for example, the Western Truck Line Committee and its standing rate committee. They may appear before that committee either in writing or in person, publicly, and either support or oppose the rate |