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An interesting consequence of this compartmentalized situation occurs when political entrepreneurs are successful in providing opportunities for economic entrepreneurs but are less successful in providing opportunities for themselves. In such instances estrangement in the African community is common, at least for a time. During their estrangement, political entrepreneurs attempt to organize less fortunate members of the population, channeling grievances against African economic entrepreneurism as well as expatriate.

The most complex situation exists when a single political entity contains subsistence, compartmental, and bazaar types of commercial systems. This becomes critical if the bazaar and the subsistence sectors are open to local inhabitants, but the large-scale commercial enterprises are in the hands of expatriates. Typically, severe discontinuities in social structure allow effective organizations on the part of political entrepreneurs but do not allow effective outlets for their activities. The "solutions" are extreme, involving increasingly high degrees of coercion, partly because so many combinations of events and forces are possible. Because there is almost no way to provide durable satisfactions to the different membership groups in such societies, extremely effective organization is needed by political entrepreneurs for purposes of control. However, the loose structuring of the system makes it difficult to maintain stable organization membership.

Characteristically, aspects of all three commercial systems are to be found in varying proportions in all African territories. Where the system is predominantly compartmentalized, the nationalist effort focuses on goals of political equality, democracy, and racial tolerance. Independence is the supreme goal, with industrialization as a more remote concern. In a bazaar system, political equality and rapid social mobility are the main targets of nationalist political entrepreneurs. Where a participant commercial system predominates, all ten goals receive attention. Political entrepreneurs try to instill political puritanism as the basis for internal abstinence from current consumption, and stress loyalty to the group as a means of devoting social institutions to the simultaneous struggle for economic growth and political independence.

In such systems industrialization is the only possible "solution." Except when there are outbreaks of various sorts, the main mediator against coercion is corruption. In this respect it serves a useful purpose. Political entrepreneurs attempt to control corruption as a form of patronage and use it as a means of maintaining support. A modest degree of corruption can soften the processes of cultural integration until some order and discipline are imposed and until new organizations devoted to welfare and productive activities can be established.

The strategy of leadership and the degree of coercion required to create change will vary, depending on the components of compartmentalization and the significance of bazaar and commercial participation. Where all the components are present in appreciable degrees, especially if there is a mass political party and individuals can participate in politics on a universal franchise system, political entrepreneurs walk a tightrope between coercion and patronage. They use corruption and inveigh against it; attack tribalism and offer alternatives to those in the subsistence sector, hoping to gain support; use old families in the civil service; attempt to modify the bazaar by rationalizing productive and exchange relations; and expand opportunity by facilitating the growth of credit and providing jobs in government corporations and joint governmental and private enterprises. The more complex the mixture of systems, the more likely industrialization is to be viewed as the urgent task. Grievance must be directed against stereotypical enemies so the people will unite around both organizational and ideological goals.

Political Significance

Coming from backgrounds of oligarchical control via political or administrative service, political entrepreneurs demand a widening of the franchise and political equality. They argue for the use of democratic structures of government. Western colonial powers are most vulnerable in these terms. How can they deny to others the highest expression of their own cultures? Local leaders demand rapid social mobility. In compartmental societies they attempt to break down barriers on the basis of race; in subsistence systems they attempt to break down kinship, familial, or other obstacles to mobility. In the bazaar system they strive for greater opportunities for credit and for expanded opportunity for economic entrepreneurs. They demand equal opportunity in education and jobs and plead for racial tolerance. They remind expatriates in compartmental systems that their tenure is based on force and thus is vulnerable.

In their organizations political entrepreneurs demand loyalty to the organization. Such loyalty in compartmental systems is based on the unity of shared danger and mutual complicity. In bazaar systems loyalty is inculcated more through symbolic leadership, patronage, and corruption. In highly participant systems loyalty is normally produced by a combination of both forces with the added characteristic that the

party becomes the self-constituted society to which anyone who expects rewards must give service and devotion. The party leader becomes the symbol of nationality and society. The means open to political entrepreneurs are increasing through the operations of government, with its financial majesty. Obstacles to economic development via government and obstacles to successful organization are said to result from imperialism. Finally, political entrepreneurs implore their followers to a higher morality, that of selflessness and sacrifice.

We must now specify the relationship between the various forms of economic system, the recruitment of political entrepreneurs, and the propensities of the latter toward socialism. Subsistence economies do not as a rule provide a country with political entrepreneurs, as we have pointed out. Bazaar economies, on the other hand, have been the breeding grounds for small-scale political entrepreneurs who fill the middle leadership ranks of mass political parties. These are the "brokers" and "fixers" of nationalist parties, on whom senior and more highly educated nationalists are dependent for information, organization, and support, particularly as the small-scale entrepreneurs are in daily touch with the public and with semitraditional organizations—benevolent societies, sports groups, trade unions, cultural unions, guild associations, and the like. The tendency toward socialism among political entrepreneurs of the bazaar is based on their developing sense of status deprivation, which is only partially appeased by positions of political authority. Socialism and its emphasis on equalitarianism provide an ideology of power for benevolent purposes, while permitting the political entrepreneur to retain his pride in affiliation with the public. His generalized antagonism is against expatriate firms (in the market) and senior nationalist elites (in the party).

In participant commercial systems which produce a fairly large elite, conflict between different sections of that elite soon appears. Older educated nationalists tended to enter the professions and, having been parttime politicians, were easily displaced by younger educated groups. This process is only beginning in some new countries of Africa, but this sort of conflict contributed to the breakup of former French West Africa. It occurred in Ghana with the ousting of the United Gold Coast Convention, and is to some extent present in the party conflict between the Action Group and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in Nigeria. Political action becomes the alternative road to power and prestige while, by governmental means, access to professional and other roles is increased. Commerce itself is regarded with contempt

not because it is plebian, which would derive from an aristocratic point of view, but because it is antisocial, that is, irrational in the economic sense and socially seductive in the political sense. Once again the result is an emphasis on government activity, although few new nations are willing to deny themselves the advantages of outside investment on the largest scale on which they can obtain it.

In compartmentalized economies, mutual ethnic exclusiveness serves to deter all but the most restricted social and economic relations between major groups. Indeed, relations between ethnic groups are characterized by highly ritualized patterns, such as those of master and servant, merchant and consumer, professional and client. Violations of ritually correct relations, through which the different races can meet only tangentially, bring ostracism and other penalties. For political entrepreneurs in such situations the combination of status, racial, and economic differentials which tend to cluster around ethnic compartmentalization are the most difficult to accept and the most dangerous to challenge. The tendency for extremism is thus very great. Socialism provides a liberal ethic for extremist positions.

Thus we see that in each case political entrepreneurs are drawn toward socialism as an ideology. Nor is it without significance that socialism is the ideology of the pan-Africanist movement. What are some of the consequences of this tendency?


To summarize briefly, nationalist organizations are designed to take over the state and produce changes in society. Economic entrepreneurship is less able to accomplish rapid change under present circumstances than is political entrepreneurship. The political entrepreneur's first devotion is to his organization. The bazaar system allows nationalists some freedom to organize, but it is where there already is a relatively high degree of economic entrepreneurship, i.e., in the participant commercial systems, that political organization and nationalism have genuine possibilities for furthering industrial development.

In the organizational stage, which is not entirely dissimilar to the initial campaigns of trade unionists in the West, all efforts are made to build an organization of an inviolate character. An opposition under such circumstances is simply a form of treason if it divides the movement. Such an organization of course requires money. The commercial systems in which there is high participation provide sources of income

for nationalist purposes. Expatriate firms are anxious to provide for their own security by providing money to political leaders. Political entrepreneurs who have been successful in building organizations seek to make them the primary means of mobility, i.e., to create a system of stratification alternative to those prevailing in the society. They begin to bureaucratize their party government.

Such organizations are possible in any meaningful sense only in a participant commercial system or a compartmental commercial system. It is no accident that mass political parties have emerged only in West Africa or in Kenya; in the latter, once the party was organized, it had no outlet other than violence. Political organizations face their first difficulties in their initial efforts; once the crisis of organization is over, other crises take their place. The bureaucratization necessary for efficient party work begins to produce internal difficulties. Hence nationalist organizations are fragile in the midst of their strength. Ceaseless vigilance must be maintained to keep them in trim. In the process tremendous demands are put on political entrepreneurs; they need a selflessness and spiritual quality that can sustain enthusiasm even in the midst of success. We can now show how such circumstances propel nationalists toward a socialist ideology.

Successful nationalism is directed by political entrepreneurs in such a way that social welfare colonialism is transformed into socialism. The widely pervasive nationalist goals need to be supported by an ideology, and organizations become increasingly ideological as time goes on, since the possibilities for splitting the party increase as its tasks become more concrete. These become more concrete as the party achieves more power and responsibility, depending on the extent to which appeals have been made on a symbolic level rather than a programmatic one. Each of the goals is less than programmatic.

Success in organization tends to be undermining unless political entrepreneurs are able to control and discipline the organizations themselves and the societies over which they may come to rule. Oligarchy becomes the alternative to chaos or subordination. This leads us to a theory about political entrepreneurship. Briefly stated, the theory is that socialism is to political entrepreneurship what Protestantism was to economic entrepreneurship. The goals of nationalism have increasingly become identified as socialist goals; socialism has become a useful ethic for political entrepreneurs. It justifies the use of government for economic development and it stresses economic development. It has the associations of Western humanism without identifica

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