Page images

prepared was a timely step in this direction, and Feldman and Moore's analysis (Chapters 1-4 supra) offers a useful preliminary taxonomy. In this paper the applicability of their analysis to India is considered, but first a few comments are in order.

In several important respects their analysis departs from the paradigm stated in our four propositions. The conception of industrial societies used by Feldman and Moore does not point either theoretically or empirically to a single path for industrial development; they present a set of norms and actions required for an industrial society that is highly differentiated with respect to loci and the sequence of development; they recognize that some traditional values in preindustrial and nonindustrial societies may predispose their members to industrialization. Yet their desire to avoid a purely relativistic position leads them in the end to accept the essentials of the paradigm. Even if there is not a single path of development which should be repeated by latecomers, they say "recapitulation of the sequence is required in order to break apart the traditional network of relationships, since the gradual 'humanization' of the industrial structure is by no means a return to the status quo ante but rather rests upon the productive efficiencies made possible by a radical technical and organizational transformation" (page 365 infra). Whereas in Feldman and Moore's analysis the initial stages of industrialization do not require any over-all commitment to any particular value system, at the end of the transitional phase "commitment requires rejection of the most basic values, and a greater extent of substitution of new integrating principles than at any previous point" (pages 65-66 supra). The choice between two complexes of values must be made when individuals are already deeply involved in industrialization, not at the beginning of the process. This conclusion follows from several assumptions made by Feldman and Moore-that there is a progressive individual involvement in all the loci of the industrial system, that the loci constitute a mutually interdependent organic system, and that this system requires "system acts and norms" to integrate it.

The implications of their analysis for policy are not surprising; they engender a skepticism about efforts to mitigate the evils of industrialism and about a transitional strategy that seeks to adapt the structural features of industrial society to pre-existing social standards: "some forms of adaptation may result in 'traditional stereotyping' and therefore in decreased capacity for continuous adaptation and growth" (page 364). In the newly developing countries, the sequence that the older indus

trial societies underwent, including large-scale organization and impersonalization of work, is probably essential.

Feldman and Moore offer this analysis not as a dogmatic assertion of known truths, but as a set of hypotheses and as a conceptual framework to guide discussion and further research. They invite further study and analysis of the variety of industrial orders and the alternative paths to them.

It seems worth while here to develop the intimation of a variety of industrial orders. In doing so, there is no wish to minimize the value of the detailed analysis made by Feldman and Moore. However, the general assumptions underlying their analysis, particularly with reference to the value inconsistencies of industrial and preindustrial societies, are open to challenge on the basis of recent studies of industrialization in a variety of social and cultural conditions.2 These studies emphasize a fact not considered by Feldman and Moore to be decisive: that the late arrivals at industrialization are confronted by a situation different in some essentials from that confronted by the early arrivals. The late arrivals, for one thing, do not have to start from scratch; they can take advantage of a highly developed industrial technology, as well as of

2 Some of these studies are: Cyril S. Belshaw, In Search of Wealth, American Anthropological Association Memoir No. 80 (February 1955); Norman S. Buchanan and Howard S. Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955); Bert Hoselitz, ed., The Progress of Underdeveloped Countries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan," in Simon Kuznets, Wilbert E. Moore, and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan (Durham: Duke University Press, 1955), pp. 496-536; Margaret Mead, ed., Cultural Patterns and Technical Change (Paris: UNESCO, 1953); Manning Nash, "The Multiple Society in Economic Development: Mexico and Guatemala," American Anthropologist, 59:825-833 (October 1957), and Machine Age Maya, American Anthropological Association Memoir No. 87 (April 1958); Kunio Odaka, “An Iron Workers' Community in Japan," American Sociological Review, 15:186–195 (April 1950); Beate R. Saltz, The Human Element in Industrialization, American Anthropological Association Memoir No. 85 (December 1955); Kuo-Heng Shih, China Enters the Machine Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944); Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1890 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), and "Old Values and New Techniques in the Modernization of Japan," Far Eastern Quarterly, 14:358-363 (May 1955); Sol Tax, Penny Capitalism: A Guatemalan Indian Economy, Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, Publ. No. 16 (Washington, D. C., 1953); John Useem and Ruth H. Useem, The Western-Educated Man in India (New York: Dryden Press, 1955); William F. Whyte and Allan Holmberg, "Human Problems of U. S. Enterprise in Latin America," Human Organization, 15:1-40 (Fall 1956).

the experience and mistakes of the past. This industrial technology and its institutional organization, moreover, have been changing in the older industrialized societies, so that a wider range of technical and institutional possibilities is available than was available 150 years ago. Nuclear and solar energy, hydroelectric dams, and automation were not alternatives then, as they are for newly developing countries today. The role of state intervention is far greater today than in the early days of industrialization. Considerations of this kind suggest that the late arrivals cannot repeat the earlier sequences of industrial development. Feldman and Moore, nevertheless, choose to set aside these considerations on the grounds that a recapitulation of sequence is necessary "to break apart the traditional network of relationships" and so to make way for the segmental and total commitments required by an industrial society. This conclusion, they say, is based on a theoretical construct rather than on empirically observed phenomena.

Theoretical constructs are useful and necessary tools of scientific analysis and must be judged primarily for their relevance and fruitfulness rather than for their degree of realism. The construct of a functionally integrated industrial system unified by systemic norms that require total acceptance and internalization by individual participants should be so judged on the basis of studies of particular industrial societies. But the use of such a construct to appraise and guide policies for economic development invites scrutiny of its initial plausibility and general bias. It is in this context that the paradigmatic analysis of industrialization and the Feldman-Moore version of it are most vulnerable to criticism.

To set up requirements for industrialization that are highly idealized extrapolations from the most advanced industrial societies as measures for industrialization in newly developing countries is surely to put the process on too remote a pedestal. Where in the older industrialized societies are the integration and total commitment that this construct projects? Many peoples have learned to live with machinery of different kinds, but only in the theoretical analyses of professional ideologues has this many-sided fact been generalized into an “industrial system."

The incompatibility of such a “system” with preindustrial societies is further exaggerated when it is compared not with existing situations in these societies but with a hypothetical and idealized construct of "traditional society" and "traditional values," which are never supposed to change. Specific failures of industrialization in these societies are immediately referred to some feature of this hypothetical traditional

system; and the diverse, concrete resistances are generalized into a monolithic conservative force of "traditionalism." The battle between this force and "industrialism" is a clash of hypothetical constructs, which does not realistically reflect obstacles to economic development.


In the paper cited, McClelland uses an unsuccessful effort to organize hand-loom weavers in Orissa, India, as an example of the wrong approach to economic development. The entrepreneurial “values and motives" were missing, he believes, and this absence prevented the scheme from working. Some of these missing values are the importance of maintaining quality of workmanship, concern for a long-run relationship to consumers, and the assumption of personal responsibility for the product of one's labor. The Orissa weavers do not have an underlying drive for achievement, McClelland infers, because some weaver middlemen tried to sell inferior materials instead of assuming financial responsibility for them. These missing values are just the ones he finds in European entrepreneurial behavior and even among Western social and technical assistance workers. Unless some way is found to substitute these values for the traditional values, institutional rearrangements will not be effective. McClelland believes that these changes in values can be brought about by education and persuasion, by introducing changes in the social system, and by early character training. Of these methods, he favors early training in self-reliance, in high standards of performance, in cooperation, and in work with the hands, as the method most likely to succeed. If an entrepreneur brings the Orissa weavers out of their homes to work in one place, he can teach them these new values and others, such as limited contracts, achieved status, and "universalism," which are "required" for industrial development.

This diagnosis, in spite of the language and techniques of contemporary research on motivations, is curiously reminiscent of Samuel Smiles and the homiletics of eighteenth and nineteenth century England. As is now known, these did not succeed in bringing the English hand weavers out of their homes into the factories. The early factory population was recruited from the marginal population of women and children. Among the reasons the hand weavers resisted factory employment was their fear that it would deprive them of their personal relations to their work, their sense of achievement in identifiable products,

their self-reliance and independence, their settled relation to customers, their habits of work, and their status as skilled craftsmen (since the workshop and factory disciplines were associated with poorhouses and orphanages). These values are also important for the Indian hand weavers and craftsmen generally but are expressed within a different cultural tradition and scheme of social organization.*

Relation to Kinship and Caste

Handicrafts in India have been cultivated within particular families, usually belonging to similar castes, from generation to generation. The accumulated practical and technical knowledge is transmitted through an apprentice system in which the son or apprentice grows up with the craft in the house of the craftsman. Within the villages these artisans make up the regular complement of village craftsmen; particular families of artisans have served particular families of villagers for many generations. In the towns the artisans were organized into guildlike groups, consisting usually of all persons of a particular caste who practiced a particular craft, but including as well persons of a different caste who pursued the same occupation. These guilds (sreni) could act as law courts, had written rules, exercised some control over prices and quality, and established special market towns. They negotiated and supervised contracts, obtained special privileges for their members to march in processions with emblems, and acted as mutual aid societies." Groups of artisans were also attached to temples and royal courts, the two most important markets for handicrafts.

The status of craftsman is usually associated with the sudras, the lowest of the four orders of Indian society. This, however, is a theoretical specification. In practice, the craftsman's status is generally low, but it varies with type of craft, locality, and position of the individual

3 I am indebted to David Landes for information about the English hand weavers. See also M. D. Morris, "The Recruitment of an Industrial Labor Force in India, with British and American Comparisons," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2:305–328 (April 1960).

4 My chief sources of information on the traditions of the Indian craftsman are the writings of A. K. Coomaraswamy, Stella Kramrisch, and E. B. Havell, as indicated in subsequent footnotes. Coomaraswamy's The Indian Craftsman (London: Probsthain & Co., 1909) is a good brief introduction. During the autumn and winter of 1954-55 I observed surviving traditions. See also Nirmal Kumar Bose, The Canons of Orissan Architecture (Calcutta: R. Chatterjee, 1932).

5 The organization and functions of the guilds in Southern India are described in A. Appadorai, Economic Conditions in Southern India (1000-1500 A.D.), 2 vols. (Madras: University of Madras, 1936).

« PreviousContinue »