Western Perceptions of Soviet Economic Trends: A Staff StudyRichard F. Kaufman, United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978 - 20 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
3.5 percent Allocation of Resources assumptions barrels a day Central Intelligence Agency central planning Chairman CIA's Soviet oil civilian industries COCOM continue COUNTRIES AND UNITED Der Spiegel direct costing East Europe economic forecasting energy sector European analysts Europeans believe France future Soviet economic GARRY BROWN GNP growth growth rate improvements increase Joint Economic Committee Kaufman leverage LLOYD BENTSEN manpower million barrels Moscow officials and private oil fields outlook peak and decline percent annually Perceptions of Soviet predict Priorities and Economy private experts projections Prospects for Soviet rates of growth RICHARD BOLLING ruble expenditures SELECTED WEST EUROPEAN slowdown Soviet defense industries Soviet defense spending Soviet economic growth Soviet Economic Problems Soviet economic trends Soviet energy Soviet leaders Soviet military program Soviet military spending Soviet oil production Soviet Union spending estimates Subcommittee on Priorities Sweden total trade U.S. intelligence community Union and China-1977 United Kingdom WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES West Germany WILLIAM PROXMIRE
Popular passages
Page 3 - Before 1985, the USSR probably will find itself not only unable to supply oil to Eastern Europe and the West on the present scale but also having to compete for OPEC oil for its own use.
Page 19 - Best case (successful response to fuel and raw material problems and vigorous manpower and investment policies) Average Annual Percentage Rates of Growth 1977-80 1981-85 Factor Inputs 3'/2 3V, 3'-, Productivity y.
Page 18 - NATO defences are of such a size and quality that any attempt to breach them would require major attack. The consequences for an attacker would be incalculable, and the risks, including that of nuclear escalation, must impose caution.
Page 12 - Soviet leaders feel strongly about self-sufficiency, and if there is any hint that they are becoming dependent upon Western sources or that they are being required to make concessions for Western technology, they will choose to cut off imports even if it means postponing a new program.
Page 3 - Prospects for Soviet Oil Production, April 1977 and Prospects for Soviet Oil Production: A Supplemental Analysis , July 1977.
Page 12 - US might take to restrict or liberalize its trade policies, provided a major recession does not occur in the West and Moscow does not run out of foreign exchange or credits.
Page 2 - Soviet defense could cost only one-fifth more than US defense, and represent about the same share of GNP, though total Soviet GNP was half the size of US GNP.4 1 The gross national product (GNP) grew by 3.7 percent in 1976 and 3.5 percent in 1977.
Page 4 - the USSR may have to acquiesce to Western demand for profit sharing, equity ownership, and onsite management control.
Page 12 - The consensus is that Western trade with the Soviet Union will continue to grow regardless of steps the US might take...
Page 12 - West is too pluralistic and trade oriented to effectively use leverage anyway, that the large number of countries and business firms make it impractical to control trade to the extent implied in a leverage policy.