An Economical Analysis of the Effects of Production Risk on the Use and Management of Common-Pool RangelandsILRI (aka ILCA and ILRAD) |
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absolute risk aversion assumption Balland and Platteau Bromley Change in Expected changes in exogenous coefficient of absolute common pool resource common property resources common-pool comparative statics results costs of cooperation decrease differentiated in terms duped effect of risk equation establish the sign ex ante exogenous parameters Expected Utility ƏL ƏL ƏLƏL first-order conditions forage productivity herder's stock homogeneous incentives to cooperate incentives to deviate individual Iso-Utility Jacobian Janvry joint joint-maximization solution L₁ L₂ level of cooperation livestock marginal costs Marginal Incentives model developed negative non-cooperation non-cooperative game non-cooperative outcome Oakerson oligopoly Ostrom output price output variance overstocking P₁ parameters that positively pasture Player Prisoner's dilemma problem production risk rangeland Reaction Function repeated game risk averse herder risk in production risk preferences riskiness Scenario stocking rates terms of marginal terms of risk total stock levels Utility and Profits variables