Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union

Front Cover
Cambridge University Press, 2006 M08 24
In this 2006 book, Jonas Tallberg offers a novel perspective on some of the most fundamental questions about international cooperation and European Union politics. Offering the first systematic theoretical and empirical exploration of the influence wielded by chairmen of multilateral negotiations, Tallberg develops a rationalist theory of formal leadership and demonstrates its explanatory power through carefully selected case studies of EU negotiations. He shows that the rotating Presidency of the EU constitutes a power platform that grants governments unique opportunities to shape the outcomes of negotiations. His provocative analysis establishes that Presidencies, while performing vital functions for the EU, simultaneously exploit their privileged political position to favour national interests. Extending the scope of the analysis to international negotiations on trade, security and the environment, Tallberg further demonstrates that the influence of the EU Presidency is not an isolated occurrence but the expression of a general phenomenon in world politics - the power of the chair.

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Contents

negotiations in the European Union
6
German Presidency and car
8
a rational institutionalist
17
Figure 22 Influence of formal leaders over outcomes
38
resources and asymmetric control over
40
3 The institutional development of the EU
43
constructing
112
developing the negotiating box
122
ambition to deliver a treaty the French government was equally
138
formal leadership
172
8 Conclusion
206
Appointment of
234

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Page 34 - Once an agency is created, the political world becomes a different place. Agency bureaucrats are now political actors in their own right: they have career and institutional interests that may not be entirely congruent with their formal missions, and they have powerful resources — expertise and delegated authority - that might be employed toward these "selfish
Page 99 - Action Plan for the Northern Dimension in the External and Cross-Border Policies of the European Union 2000-2003, p.
Page 34 - There is almost always some conflict between the interests of those who delegate authority (principals) and the agents to whom they delegate it. Agents behave opportunistically, pursuing their own interests subject only to the constraints imposed by their relationship with the principal.

About the author (2006)

Jonas Tallberg is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University and a Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. He has published numerous articles on international cooperation and EU politics and is the author of European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States Comply (2003).

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