Soviet Policy in the Post-Tito BalkansPhillip A. Petersen U.S. Air Force, 1979 - 157 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
affairs Albania alliance ally American anti-Soviet Army assistance attempt August Balkan nations Belgrade bilateral bloc Brezhnev Bucharest Bulgaria Ceausescu China Chinese CMEA COMECON Communist Balkans Communist Party conflict cooperation crisis Croat Croatian Czechoslovakia defense dependence destabilization detente dissident domestic East Europe East European Eastern Europe economic Enver Hoxha European communist forces foreign policy Hoxha Hungary Ibid ideological imperialism important independence influence interests invasion of Czechoslovakia Khrushchev Macedonian major Mediterranean military intervention Moscow nationalist NATO nonalignment Peking Peking's percent planning political position potential Press pro-Soviet rapprochement regime region relations resistance role Romania Ross Johnson Serbs Sino-Albanian Sino-Soviet slavia socialism socialist sovereignty Soviet invasion Soviet leaders Soviet leadership Soviet military Soviet policy Soviet Union Stalin strategy threat three Balkan Tirane Tito Tito's trade United USSR Warsaw Pact Warsaw Treaty Warsaw Treaty Organization West Western York Yugo Yugoslav Yugoslavia
Popular passages
Page 93 - There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism.
Page 93 - And when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country — a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole — this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries.
Page 27 - Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p.
Page 156 - Professor of Political Science and a member of the Russian and East European Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
Page 9 - The state plan is one and indivisible; no parts or sections can be separated from it in order to be transferred outside the state. The management of the national economy as a whole is not possible if the questions of managing some branches or enterprises are taken away from the competence of the party and government of the respective country and transferred to extrastate...
Page 58 - Lenin, strictly adhering to the principles of equality and sovereign independence of each Party, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for their free choice of different roads in the struggle for social change of a progressive nature and for socialism.
Page 9 - The idea of a single planning body for all CMEA countries has the most serious economic and political implications. The planned management of the national economy is one of the fundamental, essential, and inalienable attributes of the sovereignty of the socialist state...
Page 32 - The time is certainly past, with the development of modern technology, when any power would seek to exploit Eastern Europe to obtain strategic advantage against the Soviet Union. It is clearly no part of our policy. Our pursuit of negotiation and detente is meant to reduce existing tensions, not to stir up new ones.
Page 32 - Our pursuit of negotiation and detente is meant to reduce existing tensions, not to stir up new ones. By the same token, the United States views the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign, not as parts of a monolith. And we can accept no doctrine that abridges their right to seek reciprocal improvement of relations with us or others.
Page 112 - II,*1 and to assist in the movement of and security for any supplies from the West that might land along the coast. At least another 8 divisions could probably operate in the mountainous terrain in southeastern Yugoslavia.45 Should the Yugoslav strategy be successfully executed, "the expected consequence would be a merging of front and rear, the transformation of the entire country into a 'hedgehog.