STATISTICS REGARDING COMPARATIVE NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS TO LONG AND SHORT TRAINS. The advocates of train-limit legislation support their principal claim that long trains have caused an increase in accidents by reference to the accident statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission. But no definite and relevant comparisons have been produced by them to show that such casualties have shown a tendency to increase with the increase in length of trains. The extent to which such statistics have been employed is limited usually to general statements that casualties due to railway operations are increasing from year to year. When more specific and definite comparisons have been made, they have failed to distinguish accidents that might, on the basis of their general reasoning, be considered as possibly related to long trains and accidents that cannot, on any reasoning whatever, be even remotely affected by long trains. It ought to go without saying that, to prove anything concerning the danger asserted to lie in long trains, the statistics offered in proof must be limited to accidents of such a nature as can be seen to have some relation to the length of the train, and must cover sufficient time and sufficiently varied conditions to be representative of actual tendencies and not abnormally affected by temporary or local influences. An example of neglect in all these respects is found in accident statistics offered by representatives of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, who appeared at a hearing before a committee of the Kansas legislature in February, 1915, in support of a bill limiting trains to not more than fifty cars. They stated that, according to the quarterly Accident Bulletin of the Interstate Commerce Commission for July, August, and September, 1901, 366 employees were killed and 1,679 employees were injured during the quarter; and that, according to Accident Bulletin No. 51, for the months of January, February, and March, 1914, 752 employees were killed and 37,315 were injured during that quarter. The first thing to note about these citations is that they are inaccurate statements of what the Interstate Commerce Commission bulletins show. The 366 killed in 1901 were trainmen only. The number killed, among all employees, was 615. The number stated as the injured does not appear in any of the tables in the Bulletin cited. Of trainmen alone, there were 4,619 injured, and of all employees there were 8,361 injured. In 1914, the figures quoted include all those casualties in railway shops, or otherwise than in purely railway occupations, known as "Industrial accidents," which were not reported by the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1901, but had become a part of the returns by 1914. These amounted to 79 killed and 24,679 injured. To get statistics that are really comparable with those for 1901, all such industrial accidents-which can be in no way whatever affected by the length of trains-must be omitted. That leaves 673 killed and 12,636 injured in the first quarter of 1914, to be compared with 615 killed and 8,361 injured in the third quarter of 1901. Even after correcting these inaccuracies, and taking only the statistics just given as more nearly representing the same classes of employees in the two years, the statistics are still without significance for the claim that the growth of long trains has caused an increase in casualties. In the first place, three months, or even a full year, for that matter, is far too short a time to reveal a surely representative picture of average conditions. And in this case, the two periods were most unhappily chosen. The three months of July, August, and September, 1901, were the very first three months of the existence of the department of the Commission that studies accident reports and prepares the accident Bulletins. It is conceded by everybody that the statistics gathered during, not only the first three months, but the first year or so, were distinctly incomplete because the organization for gathering, sifting, and compiling them was not fully worked out for some time. It will be clear to everyone, then, that no significance for the present question can attach to a comparison between the first quarter's reports and the latest quarter's reports in the Accident Bulletins of the Interstate Commerce Commission. But the comparison cited is even more fundamentally defective in that it neglects to distinguish between accidents fairly subject to inquiry as to whether affected by the length of trains, and accidents that can have only a very remote relation to length of trains, if any at all. There are many trainmen injured who have nothing to do with long trains, and many of the casualties to employees who are connected with trains are in no way due to the length of the trains. Yard trainmen, for example, have nothing to do with trains on the road, but handle long trains in yards only when such trains are in separate sections. Therefore, it hardly needs to be argued that such comparisons of casualties prove nothing as to the increase in danger claimed to have followed the growth in number of long trains. The increase in total casualties to trainmen may just as well have been due to many causes in no way related to length of train as to causes that may possibly be so related; and the increase may just as well have occurred while there was an actual decrease in the number of casualties to those employees whose risk, it is claimed, is affected by the length of the trains. Even though allowance be made for all these classes of employees, and the statistics limited to casualties to trainmen on the road (who, of all employees, can most reasonably be assumed to be affected by train length), still the comparison would prove nothing, because so many of the casualties even to trainmen are due to causes in no way connected with length of train, and because no separation is made between casualties to trainmen on long trains and those to trainmen on short trains. Statistical verification of the claim that long trains are more hazardous to operate than short trains would require, at the very least, that the data for casualties in connection with long trains be separated from those in connection with short trains, both classes of trains being operated under substantially the same conditions. Otherwise no comparison is possible between the risk attendant upon each class of trains in itself. But this need is not met by any statistics regularly reported by the Interstate Commerce Commission, because the distinction between long and short trains has never been observed in its compilations. In the absence of such comprehensive data, various railways have classified the casualties on their lines according as they occurred on long or short trains, and have presented the results at hearings before legislative committees that have considered bills for limiting train length. Several of these statements are significant, though the data are so arranged that they are not readily comparable with each other. At a hearing before a committee of the General Assembly of Virginia on a bill proposing to limit all freight trains to 50 cars, N. D. Maher, vice-president of the Norfolk & Western, presented a statement for that road covering a period of two years showing the number of trains of over and under 50 cars and the number of deaths and injuries resulting from their operation. The statistics were as follows: Trains and Train Mileage. Number of trains of more than 50 cars (freight) Number of trains of 50 cars or less (including passenger) Total mileage of freight trains of more than 50 cars. trains) Total passenger train mileage. Total mileage of freight trains of 50 cars or less Of the 20 deaths and 521 injuries to employees caused by trains of 50 cars or less, 5 deaths and 114 injuries resulted from the movement of passenger trains, leaving 15 deaths and 407 injuries due to the movement of freight trains of 50 cars or less. In the cases of persons other than employees, 24 deaths and 42 injuries caused by trains of 50 cars or less resulted from the movement of passenger trains, leaving 52 deaths and 151 injuries caused by freight trains of 50 cars or less. There were thus in the two years 9 persons killed and 195 injured by freight trains of more than 50 cars, and 67 persons killed and 558 injured by freight trains of less than 50 cars. The distribution of casualties between the two classes of trains, compared with the distribution of number of trains between the two classes, including all trains, is then as follows: Percentage Distribution of Trains and Casualties. It appears from this comparison that, while there were more than one-half as many trains of over 50 cars as of trains of 50 cars or less, including passenger trains, the number of fatalities in connection with the long trains was less than one-tenth of the number in connection with the short trains, and of injuries slightly more than one-fourth. This discloses in a general way that the casualties on long trains were relatively fewer than on short trains. By how much fewer is more forcefully and definitely apparent when it is stated that, for an equal number of long and short trains, the number of persons killed in connection with long trains on the Norfolk & Western was only about one-sixth of the number killed in connection with short trains, while the number injured was only one-half as many. The data in this case are complete enough to permit casualties to passengers and employees to be considered separately and with relation to the mileage of each class of trains. The results can also be distinguished as between the passenger and freight service. Eliminating from the calculation the numbers of casualties in connection with the movement of passenger trains and relating the remaining numbers of casualties, connected with freight service, to the mileage of the two classes of freight trains, the result is as follows: Percentage Distribution of Freight Trains and Casualties. Freight trains of more than 50 cars. 8 52 13.3 86.7 16 9.6 151 90.4 |