The Rebel's DilemmaUniversity of Michigan Press, 1995 - 514 pages Since the mid-1960s, theorists have elaborated over two dozen different solutions to the collective action problem. During much of this same period, students of conflict have explored many questions about protest and rebellion. The Rebel's Dilemma examines what happens when one brings the full richness of collective action theories to bear on the many complex problems of collective dissent. The book develops a new typology of solutions to the collective action problem: market, community, contract, and hierarchy. It then uses the typology to explain how the Rebel's Dilemma (i.e., the problem applied to collective dissent) is overcome by rebels. In placing two dozen different sets of solutions into this typology, four themes are developed. First, the Rebel's Dilemma is not all that much of a dilemma. If the collective action problem can be solved in some two dozen ways, it cannot pose an insurmountable hurdle for potential dissidents. Second, both dissidents and regimes know that the Rebel's Dilemma can be overcome. While dissidents try to solve their collective action problem, the regime tries to intensify that problem. This struggle over solutions to the collective action problem is the political struggle between regimes and oppositions. Third, analysts must specify the conditions under which collective action is effective. Finally, the collective action approach makes a major contribution to conflict studies. By dissecting the causes and consequences of solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma, the approach offers a set of implications that are far richer than anything offered by its competitors. |
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Page 329
... hence drive the social contract approach ( sect . 5.2 ) . Orientations toward political morality and political corruption influ- ence the demand for rent - seeking and hence affect the Administer Selective Incentives solution ( sect ...
... hence drive the social contract approach ( sect . 5.2 ) . Orientations toward political morality and political corruption influ- ence the demand for rent - seeking and hence affect the Administer Selective Incentives solution ( sect ...
Page 331
... hence influences the Lower Costs solution ( sect . 3.2.5 ) . • The state's weakness affects dissidents ' estimates of their chances of success and hence drives the Increase the Probability of Winning solution ( sect . 3.6.2.2 ) ...
... hence influences the Lower Costs solution ( sect . 3.2.5 ) . • The state's weakness affects dissidents ' estimates of their chances of success and hence drives the Increase the Probability of Winning solution ( sect . 3.6.2.2 ) ...
Page 450
... hence , the less violent is the conflict . " Second , " the more groups engage in conflict over nonrealistic issues , the greater is the level of emotional arousal and involvement in the conflict , and hence , the more violent is the ...
... hence , the less violent is the conflict . " Second , " the more groups engage in conflict over nonrealistic issues , the greater is the level of emotional arousal and involvement in the conflict , and hence , the more violent is the ...
Contents
The Problem Defined | 3 |
Chapter | 13 |
Collective Dissent | 30 |
Copyright | |
15 other sections not shown
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activities actors approach argues argument become benefits CA problem CA theories chap coalition collective action collective dissent collective violence conflict studies consequences contributions cooperation costs coup create demonstrate dent dissident entrepreneurs dissident groups dissident leaders dissident movements dissident organizations dissident's effective elites emphasis in original example expectations facilitates followers goals grievances guerrilla guerrilla warfare Gurr Hence Hierarchy ideology individual institutions interests involved leadership lective dissent ment military mobilization mutual offers Olson's opportunity costs organizational participation in collective parties patrons peasant PG-PD political preexisting organizations probability of winning problem produce proposition protest and rebellion Public Bads radical rational Rebel's Dilemma regime's regimes and oppositions rent seeking research program revolution revolutionary riots sect seek selective incentives self-interest sident social contract social movements society solve strategy struggle success suggests tactics Tarrow terrorists theories theorists Tilly tion Tit-For-Tat tive victory workers Zald