Modality, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan MarcusWalter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman, Nicholas Asher Cambridge University Press, 1995 M01 27 - 270 pages Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explantion of actions by beliefs. This state of the art collection honors one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers. |
Contents
Ruth Barcan Marcus and the Barcan Formula | 3 |
The Interaction of Modality with Quantification | 12 |
S1 Is Not So Simple | 29 |
A Problem in PossibleWorld Semantics | 41 |
Senses of Essence | 53 |
Structuralism and the Concept of Set | 74 |
Toward | 93 |
Moral Dilemmas Revisited | 117 |
Perspectival Guilt | 129 |
Bad Luck | 152 |
Marcus and the Problem of Nested Deontic Modalities | 174 |
Pierre Saul Ruth and Bob and a Puzzle about Belief | 201 |
Closure and Consistency | 215 |
De Re Belief Action Explanations and the Essential | 235 |
TSentences | 250 |
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Common terms and phrases
action agent analytic argument axiom axiom of replacement Barcan formula behavior circumstances claim concept of set consequence counterpart definition deontic dicto disposition distinction domain doxastic commitment dstit emotional English iff essence essentially example exist existential explain extensional fact false forbidden Frege full belief function given guilt homophonic instances idea identity instances of Schema intensional Julius Caesar KIT FINE Kripke Kripke's language latitudinarianism linguistic London is pretty Marcus's Mathematics meaning modal logic Moral Dilemmas Moral Luck natural notion NUEL BELNAP object perspectival Philosophy Pierre possible worlds potential predicate logic principle priori problem proper names proposition expressed puzzle quantifiers question rational reason reference relation responsibility restricted quantification Ruth Barcan Marcus second-order logic semantics sense sentence set theory Settled-true snow is white Socrates structuralist structuralist view Suppose T-sentences thing true in English true in virtue truth predicate variables Vulcan wrong