Privacy and Social FreedomCambridge University Press, 1992 M07 31 - 225 pages This book attacks the assumption found in much moral philosophy that social control as such is an intellectually and morally destructive force. It replaces this view with a richer and deeper perspective on the nature of social character aimed at showing how social freedom cannot mean immunity from social pressure. The author demonstrates how our competence as rational and social agents depends on a constructive adaptation of social control mechanisms. Our facility at achieving our goals is enhanced, rather than undermined, by social control. The author then articulates sources, contracts, and degrees of legitimate social control in different social and historical settings. Drawing on a wide range of material in moral and political philosophy, law, cognitive and social psychology, anthropology, and literature, Professor Schoeman shows how the aim of moral philosophy ought to be to understand our social character, not to establish fortifications against it in the name of rationality and autonomy. |
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Allan Gibbard Annette Baier argue articulate rationality aspects assessment associations authority autonomy behavior Cambridge Chapter character Charlotte cognitive concern conformity consider context critical culture Daniel Kahneman dependence differentiates dimensions discussion domain effective emotional extent factors feel Ferdinand David first-order reasons focus function Georg Simmel Georges Duby gossip Harvard University Harvard University Press human important independent individual influence intimacy intimate Isabel issue Jon Elster Joseph Raz legitimate limited lives Maggie Maggie's maintain marriage means Mill Mill's Miss Tita moral theory motivation nature notion objective one's outlook overreaching person perspective Philippe Aries philosophers political practices principles privacy norms private spheres protect Psychology public roles recognize regard relate relationships relevant require response restricted Ruth Gavison self-regarding sense Simmel social control social freedom social norms social pressure society Solomon Asch sorts of privacy standard strategies structure suggests tradition trust understanding vacy vis-à-vis vulnerable