Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-MakingSpringer Science & Business Media, 2006 M07 2 - 99 pages Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes. |
Contents
1 | |
CONCEPTUALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION | 19 |
ASSESSING THE CURRENT STATE | 31 |
A DATA SET AND AN ANALYSIS OF FRANCE | 48 |
THE EUROPEAN | 58 |
EVALUATING THE PREDICTIVE POWER | 72 |
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION | 81 |
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97 | |
Other editions - View all
Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-Making Torsten J. Selck Limited preview - 2006 |
Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-Making Torsten J. Selck No preview available - 2010 |
Common terms and phrases
actors agenda-setter amendments analysis analyze assent procedure assumes Bueno de Mesquita Búrca chapter codecision procedure Commission proposal common position compared computer simulation Constitution consultation procedure cooperation procedure Council members Craig Crombez data set decision-making power different models dimensionality dimensions empirical information European Commission European Parliament European Union legislative existing Federalist Papers focus formal models France Germany ideal position indifference curves institutional actors institutional arrangements integration issue space Italy König large number Laruelle legislative politics legislative procedures legislative proposal median model median voter theorem Moser negotiations Nice Treaty number of issues players policy outcome policy process political actors possible preferred position present qualified majority represents role Selck Shepsle Single European Act spatial models spatial voting models status quo Steunenberg 1994 theoretical theory Treaty of Nice Tsebelis and Garrett unanimity UNION LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING Union legislative process United Kingdom veto voting rule voting threshold