The Language of ThoughtHarvard University Press, 1975 - 214 pages In a compelling defense of the speculative approach to the philosophy of mind, Jerry Fodor argues that, while our best current theories of cognitive psychology view many higher processes as computational, computation itself presupposes an internal medium of representation. Fodor's prime concerns are to buttress the notion of internal representation from a philosophical viewpoint, and to determine those characteristics of this conceptual construct using the empirical data available from linguistics and cognitive psychology. |
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analysis apply argument assigned assume assumption bachelor behavior believe breakfast of champions bridge laws causal Churchill coextensive cognitive processes cognitive psychology communication computational concept learning correspondence course defined determined discussion disjunction empirical equi example express fact Fodor formulae give the speech grammar hearer hypothesis identical images inference input insofar INTERNAL CODE internal representations involves John kind predicates language of thought LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE logic machine mechanisms mediate mental messages natural language notion organism perception philosophers picture plausible present point PRIVATE LANGUAGE propositional attitudes psycholinguistic PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE psychological theories PUBLIC LANGUAGES reductionism reference relation remarked represent representational system satisfy semantic properties sense sensory sentence sort speaker special sciences stimulus structural description suppose syntactic things tion token physicalism true iff truth conditions truth definition truth rule typically underlying representation unity of science unmarried utterance variables verbal visual Wheaties