Preferences and Procedures: European Union Legislative Decision-Making

Front Cover
Springer Science & Business Media, 2006 M03 7 - 99 pages
Preferences and Procedures presents and tests game-theoretic models of European Union legislative decision-making. It is inspired by the idea of linking statistical testing strategies firmly to formal models of EU policymaking. After describing salient features of the EU legislative process and comparing different models of how the EU negotiates new legislative measures, the models' predictive power is evaluated. On a more general level, Preferences and Procedures answers questions regarding the empirically recognizable effects of institutional arrangements on joint bargaining outcomes.

From inside the book

Contents

CHAPTER
1
Current Empirical Evidence
15
CHAPTER 3
28
2
34
GERMANY ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
48
CHAPTER 6
58
Copyright

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

About the author (2006)

Torsten J. Selck is working as Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands.

Bibliographic information