Moral PsychologySergio Tenenbaum Rodopi, 2007 - 343 pages In recent decades the central questions of moral psychology have attracted renewed interest. Contemporary work on moral motivation and the rationality of moral action has broadened its focus to include a wide array of related issues. New interpretations of historical figures have also contributed to conceptual advances in moral psychology, in a way unparalleled in any other area of philosophy. This volume presents original work from some of the most prominent philosophers currently working on moral psychology, spanning both the historical and the contemporary problem-based approaches. |
Contents
9 | |
15 | |
37 | |
Donald Ainslie Character Traits and the Humean Approach | 79 |
Stephen Engstrom Kant on the Agreeable and the Good | 111 |
Steven Arkonovich Goals Wishes and Reasons for Action | 161 |
Ethical Theory | 185 |
A Reply to Hume | 213 |
Connie S Rosati Mortality Agency and Regret | 231 |
G F Schueler Rationality and Character Traits | 261 |
Michael Smith Is There a Nexus between Reasons and Ration | 279 |
David Sobel Practical Reasons and Mistakes of Practical | 299 |
Sergio Tenenbaum The Conclusion of Practical Reason | 323 |
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Common terms and phrases
actuality agent agent’s agreeable argues argument Aristotelian Thesis Aristotle Aristotle's awareness behavior beliefs believing that q Callicles Cambridge causal character traits choice choose claim conception concerns conclusion of practical consider considerations that justify deliberation depends determine direction of fit distinction efficacy ethical theory eudaimonia example explain fact faculty of desire feelings goal Gorgias habituation human Hume Hume’s Humean idea indirect passions intention judgments Kant Kant’s kind knowledge Korsgaard McDowell moral conflict Moral Psychology motivating reasons normative reasons object one’s Oxford particular phenomenology Philosophy phronesis plausible Polus possible Poznań practical cognition practical pleasure practical reasoning prima facie duties problem protreptic psychological pursue question rational desire reasons for action regret relation relevant representation role seems sense sensible desire simply Smith Socrates someone sort subjectivism subjectivist suggests suppose teleological argument theoretical things understanding University Press virtue virtuous action Williams