Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game TheoryEdward Elgar Publishing, 2003 M01 1 - 464 pages "This book explores the evolution, through the first half of the 20th century, of the key neoclassical concept of rationality. The analysis begins with the development of modern decision theory, covers the interwar debates over the role of perfect fo |
Contents
| 1 | |
2 The Escape from Psychology | 41 |
3 The Escape from Perfect Foresight | 135 |
Interlude | 201 |
4 Von Neumann and Morgensterns Game Theory | 211 |
5 Nashs Game Theory | 295 |
The Fall and Rise of Modern Game Theory | 341 |
| 411 | |
| 443 | |
Common terms and phrases
2P ZSG actual analysis analytical approach argued argument assumption axioms Bayesian Bayesian game beliefs Chapter characterization of rationality choice consistency view Debreu decision theory discipline disequilibrium dynamic economic equilibrium economic theory empirical epistemic escape from psychology existence expectations explain explicitly fact feature fixed-point formal formalist game theory goal Hayek he/she Hence Hicks Hilbert's his/her ibid image of economics individual interpretation interwar introspection issue John von Neumann knowledge latter Lindahl logical logical positivism mathematical mathematicians maximization mental variables methodological minimax Mirowski mixed strategies Morgenstern Nash Nash equilibrium Nash's neoclassical economics neoclassical economists Neumann non-cooperative game notion observation ordinal utility outcome paper Pareto payoff perfect foresight play players possible postulates preference problem purely rational behavior rigorous rival role Samuelson scientific setup social solution concept SOR image specific strategy TGEB theoretical utility theory Value and Capital value theory Vienna Circle view of rationality vN/M