United States-Soviet Relations, 1990: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, and on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, February 21, March 8, April 5, May 2, and June 12, 1990U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990 - 226 pages |
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agree agreement American Armenia arms control Azerbaijan bachev ballistic missiles Baltic Republics BIALER Brezhnev Doctrine BROWN Central Chairman HAMILTON committee Communist party Congress course cruise missiles DAWISHA democratic deployed Deputies DRELL Eastern Europe economic reform elections example federation forces Germany GILMAN GOBLE going Gorbachev HARTMAN HEWETT ICBMs important independence institutions interest issue kind LAPIDUS LEACH leaders LEGVOLD Leonid Abalkin Lithuania LUKENS major MAKAROV ment Middle East military Moscow move movement negotiations nuclear weapons opinion percent perestroika PERLE President problem question radical reductions relations role rubles Russian SAGDEYEV situation socialist SOLARZ Soviet economy Soviet foreign policy Soviet leadership Soviet Union STANKEVICH START II START treaty statement strategic STURUA subcommittee summit Supreme Soviet talking Thank things threat tion treaty trying U.S.-Soviet Ukraine United USSR verification warheads Warsaw Pact
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Page 105 - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met at 2:30 pm, in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Page 205 - Konrad have admitted the possibility of a "gradual, controlled transformation of the Soviet bloc into a looser community of nations capable of interacting with Western Europe on a partnership...
Page 207 - ... to the [higher] interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement."14 This new definition, applied with force by Soviet tanks, obviously was meant to limit the independence of the East Europeans far more than that of the Soviets. After coming to power in March 1985, Gorbachev called several times for building intra-bloc relations on a new basis. On the whole he has shied away from using the term socialist internationalism, limiting his references to only the most important state...
Page 207 - ... movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement.
Page 204 - common home" Soviet views of Europe are complex and multifaceted. They arise from the historical Russian conflict between on the one hand the Slavophile rejection of Western culture's subversive and corrupting nature and on the other the Westernizers' embrace of the values of the Enlightenment and the objectives of economic development.
Page 201 - But it was not without losses, and rather serious ones at that. Drawing on the Soviet experience, some countries failed duly to consider their own specifics. Even worse, a stereotyped approach was given an ideological tint by some of our theoreticians and especially practical leaders who acted as almost the sole guardians of truth. Without taking into consideration the novelty of problems and the specific features of different socialist countries, they sometimes displayed suspicion toward those countries'...
Page 204 - ... exclude' the Soviet Union from Europe. Now and then, as if inadvertently, they equate 'Europe' with 'Western Europe'. Such ploys, however, cannot change the geographic and historical realities. Russia's trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by Christianity. [...] The history of Russia is an organic part of the great European history.
Page 201 - Even worse, a stereotyped approach was given an ideological tint by some of our theoreticians and especially practical leaders who acted as almost the sole guardians of truth. Without taking into consideration the novelty of problems and the specific features of different socialist countries, they sometimes displayed suspicion toward those countries' approaches to certain problems. . . . Furthermore, negative accretions in these relations were not examined with a sufficient degree of frankness, which...
Page 205 - L'Unita in January 1988. In it he emphasized that "one of the main positive aspects of Gorbachev's visit to Prague was the idea of a 'new way of thinking' about Europe. This idea ought to be consistently affirmed in our country, to overcome the burden of the past and to set in motion Czechoslovak restructuring. To build a united process, we must first restore confidence among European nations and states. I see this as the only way in which we can have a future, given the 23 George Konrad, interviewed...
Page 193 - Rakhmanin's point of view was certainly not without adherents in the Central Committee and elsewhere, opposition to it grew and gained preeminence. One of the most forceful, and earliest, enunciations of new thinking in the realm of socialist internationalism came from Yuriy Novopashin, who warned that there was "no magic wand, that could dispose of 'national egoism...