An Economical Analysis of the Effects of Production Risk on the Use and Management of Common-Pool RangelandsILRI (aka ILCA and ILRAD) |
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91 Stocking Level absolute risk aversion Addis Ababa assumption Balland and Platteau Bromley Change in Expected changes in exogenous coefficient of absolute common pool resource common property resources common-pool comparative statics results costs of cooperation decrease differentiated in terms effect of risk equation establish the sign ex ante exogenous parameters Expected Utility ƏL ƏL ƏLƏL first-order conditions forage productivity herder's stock homogeneous incentives to cooperate incentives to deviate individual Iso-Utility Jacobian Janvry joint joint-maximization solution L₁ L₂ level of cooperation livestock marginal costs Marginal Incentives model developed negative non-cooperation non-cooperative game non-cooperative outcome oligopoly Ostrom output price output variance overstocking P₁ parameters that positively pasture Player Prisoner's dilemma problem production risk rangeland Reaction Function response risk in production risk preferences riskiness Scenario stocking rates sub-Saharan Africa terms of marginal terms of risk total stock levels Utility and Profits variables Οπ