The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Being a Collection of Essays Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay in Support of the Constitution Agreed Upon September 17, 1787, Volume 1M. W. Dunne, 1901 - 225 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
Achæans administration admit advantage America Amphictyonic appear appointed articles of Confederation authority body branch Britain circumstances citizens clause commerce common Confederacy Congress Connecticut consideration considered convention councils dæmon danger declared defense depend duties effect elections equal eral ernment established executive exercise existing experience extent faction favor February 26 federal government FEDERALIST force foreign former HAMILTON important individual influence instances interests jealousy judiciary departments lative latter laws legislative legislature less liberty Lycurgus Macedon means ment military militia Montesquieu national government national legislature nature necessary necessity objects particular parties passions peace persons political possess principle probable proper proportion propriety provision PUBLIUS reason regulation render representation representatives republic republican require requisite respect revenue Rhode Island Senate situation society South Carolina Sparta spirit stadtholder standing armies sufficient supposed taxes tion treaties Union United usurpation York Packet
Popular passages
Page 275 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Page 58 - The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.
Page 254 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Page 62 - ... it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried ; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.
Page 294 - It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.
Page 158 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Page xxiii - ... a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of Government. History will teach us, that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism, than the latter; and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an obsequious court to the people ; commencing Demagogues,...
Page 294 - Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: The one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, -as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole, very improbable, if not...
Page 139 - The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite ; and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances ; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to preside over the common defence.
Page 58 - So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.